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by Yuri Slezkine , Sonja Luehrmann and Todd Weir December 21, 2018
A conversation with Yuri Slezkine
tif.ssrc.org/2018/12/21/a-conversation-with-yuri-slezkine
As the final installment of the Fall 2018 book forum on The
House of Government, forum co-curators Sonja Luehrmann
and Todd Weir interviewed author Yuri Slezkine. Many of
the questions were sparked directly from other
contributions to the forum. You can read the other essays
here.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
______
Sonja Luehrmann and Todd Weir: Thank you for agreeing to
answer some questions sparked by contributions to this
forum.
Some contributors seem convinced by your analysis of
Bolshevism as millenarianism, others remain skeptical. We
would like to ask you to explain your thinking a little more. In his review essay in Canadian-
American Slavic Studies, Michael David-Fox makes a distinction between “soft” and “hard”
versions of the analogy between Bolshevism and religion. In his view, the soft version uses
religious imagery and intertextual references as problems for analysis, while in hard versions
they are treated as proof that Bolshevism is millenarian. Would you agree with his placement
of your book as an example of the “hard” analogy?
Yuri Slezkine: I don’t draw an analogy between Bolshevism and religion. I don’t use the
concept of “religion” at all, for reasons I explain in Chapter 3 of the book. I argue, rather,
that Bolshevism is (not similar to, but is) a form of millenarianism, which I define as the
expectation of an imminent and violent destruction of the existing order of things, followed
by an eternity of harmony. By that definition, a great variety of faiths and movements—
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Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Islam, Mormonism, Rastafarianism, Taiping, Nazism, Khmer
Rouge, Sabbateans, Branch Davidians, the Manson Family, the Yellow Turban, the Peoples
Temple—are, or at one point were, millenarian. This does not imply similarity in any other
respect any more than does a statement that Cuba, Hungary, and North Korea were all
socialist countries (according to a certain definition of “socialism”) or that my friends Igor
and Konstantin are both bald (defined as “having little to no hair on top of one’s head”).
SL and TW: Mayfair Yang has sought to situate the Maoist cult in relationship to Chinese
peasant culture. She talked about deep structures present in the population that were acted
upon by the Chinese communists. You largely avoid placing the Bolsheviks in relation to the
religious history or culture of Russia. Yet, in the epilogue you make a big claim that
Bolshevism was the attempted Reformation of Russia. This claim was not evident in the text
itself. Could you elaborate a bit: How would you situate Bolshevism in Russian religious
history?
YS: I don’t think that Bolshevism had much to do with Orthodox Christianity (if that’s what
you mean by Russian religious history). Its millenarian doctrine came from Germany, and
Party officials from Russian Orthodox backgrounds were underrepresented in the House of
Government, compared to their Jewish, Latvian (formerly Lutheran), and Polish (formerly
Catholic) comrades. The fact that most converts and ostensible converts came from the
Orthodox tradition had serious consequences for the way Bolshevism was practiced
outside the original sect, but that is not part of my book’s subject. In Chapter 33, I talk about
“Reformation” as an attempted “disciplinary revolution,” not a particular Christian
movement.
SL and TW: We’d like you to say something about your authorial voice and your relationship
to different narrative genres, especially the novel. While some anthropologists write
reflexively, historians generally like to appear invisible. But you, it seems to us, very often take
the stance of the narrator of a novel. You allow yourself to work in irony and parody. This
makes your texts daring, provocative, very readable, and humorous. However, there may be a
cost. At best, the reader wonders where you stand; at worst, it leaves you open to easy
dismissal. How does irony serve your aims as a historian?
YS: All historians create narratives. Some are more self-conscious about it than others. I
called my book a saga (or epic) and structured it accordingly, with some novelistic
elements as part of the architecture. I have been reading history books for many years, as a
matter of pleasure as well as duty, but most of my sense of the past still comes from
novels. My hope is that some of the devices I used will help the reader form more vivid and
more durable memories of the people and places I write about. But of course I was not
joking when I wrote in a special disclaimer that my book is about what actually happened
(as I see it), as opposed to what might have happened (as I imagine it). Some parts of the
book are in the tragic and comic key, but you are right that irony wins out. It creates a
distancing effect and helps leave moral judgment to the reader. Sometimes it is good for
the reader not to know where the author stands (and for the author to remain uncertain).
SL and TW: You clearly don’t share the attitude of many advocates of the theory of political
religion, such as the writer Viktor Ardov quoted by Katya Tolstaya, who held that Christianity
was the norm and communism the “satanic parody.” Nevertheless, as the contributors
2/3
suggest, your book is certain to bring political religion back into the study of communism.
How would you respond to this association?
YS: With regret. All movements commonly known as “religions” are political. Pontius Pilate,
whatever his private reservations, had good reasons for wanting Jesus out of the way. And
who doubts the political nature and success of early Islam? And of course revolutionary
politics are by definition “religious” in the sense of being matters of life and death (or
sacred beginnings and ends). Victoria Smolkin’s essay is very insightful and eloquent on
this score.
SL and TW: Why does it matter whether or not we consider Bolshevism, Fascism, or other
political movements “religions”? What consequences does it have for theories of religion and
theories of politics? Are there alternative conceptualizations that would fit the kind of
materials historians of twentieth-century authoritarianism work with, for example, the
umbrella concept of “ideocracy,” which you introduce in the final chapter of the book?
YS: By Katya Tolstaya‘s “substantive” definition, Bolshevism and Fascism are not religions;
by Mayfair Yang‘s Durkheimian one, they are (along with nationalism and many other
things). My own preference is to drop the word “religion” altogether. It impedes
communication and blinds people to connections they would otherwise find illuminating.
Can you think of a definition of “totalitarianism” that would not apply to Christianity, Islam,
and most other ideologies Katya Tolstaya would call religions? The fixation on the need to
keep “religions” separate is the only reason most scholars consider Nazism and
Bolshevism bizarre modern inventions.
As for the term “ideocracy,” I use it interchangeably with “theocracy” and “hierocracy” to
designate states run by ideology professionals (“priests”). It has a clear meaning and can
be used productively for any number of comparisons.
SL and TW: Finally, an open question. What have you learned from the forum contributions?
To whom would you like to respond?
YS: In an answer to one of your previous questions I said that sometimes it is good when
the reader is not sure where the author stands. Well, now I know that sometimes it is not.
There is only one thing that I would like to clarify. Heather Coleman writes that I consider
the failure of Stalin’s reformation the result of “Orthodoxy’s purported inadequacies.” In
fact, I consider it the result of Orthodoxy’s very real advantages. Because of Orthodoxy’s
relatively lax disciplining practices, individual Russians tend to be less keen on self-
censorship and mutual surveillance than most other heirs to the Christian tradition. The
Bolsheviks tried to change that but gave up after a while, thank goodness. Big Brother is
much less patient and effective than Big Nurse.
SL and TW: Thank you for this conversation.
YS: Thank you very much!
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